BirdsCommaAngry
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- Joined
- Jan 13, 2013
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When Percy Harvin was traded, it was difficult to determine a more truthful opinion about whether the deeper meaning of this move was good, bad, or downright ugly. As an avid reader of non-fiction with a preference for anything and everything dealing with our own psychology, I've had the fortune of being made aware of a handful of insights into the issue. What's remarkable is just as when a friend gets a new car and we start to notice the same model everywhere we go, whenever I learn about concepts with tremendous potential for improving our lives, they start popping up everywhere too. There are both the positive instances where they're being used for the benefit of ourselves and others and the negative instances where improvement is sorely needed. What's even more remarkable is that one of the places they can be seen most frequently is with our very own Seattle Seahawks. Upon seeing some of these instances, there's one conclusion to be drawn about trading Percy Harvin. It wasn't emblematic of merely a mistake but instead it demonstrates the very quality that makes us a cut above so many other organizations - not just in the NFL but the entire world.
I've read about coaching and the neurological functions behind the development of expertise. When I watched an exchange between Kris Richard and Earl Thomas after a play during training camp, it served as a reminder that what a coach teaches isn't half as important as how he chooses to attempt to teach it. The play was a short pass over the middle where ET was narrowly beaten as his diving attempt to swat the ball was inches short of denying the completion. Kris Richard ran up to ET like he was defender in the NBA and ET had just received a pass, asked him what happened, and shook his head in disagreement at ET's assertion that he was just too slow to make the play. He then proceeded to demonstrate that had ET attempted to deflect the pass with his right arm instead of his left (he was diving to his left) his body would have been able to extend a slightly greater distance, and he would have made the play. Kris Richard then quickly ran back to the sideline and this exchange was over before all the players were even back to the line of scrimmage. What this accomplished was ET's error was identified and corrected without taking him out of the situational context of where the information is important. It was also done quickly enough to allow ET zero opportunity to misjudge his own error. Social scientists who study learning advocate this very approach and we've been intently personifying what they preach.
I've read about status-quo bias and our tendencies to prefer immediate gratification over delayed gratification. Status-quo bias is the tendency for us to prefer continuing as we are because we mistake change as a presumably negative experience instead of a more accurate prediction that involves the potential for improvement. In studies we've been noted to make odd decisions like preferring a cheaper but less consistent electrical service over a more expensive but more consistent competitor when it's the one we're used to and not necessarily the best service for our needs. We've been noted to prefer receiving a gift of $100 today over $200 a month from now but when the question is changed to a gift of $100 12 months from now or a gift of $200 13 months from now, we no longer mind waiting the extra month for an addition $100 dollars. We are prone to errors we may not even be aware of and those who are aware gain a competitive advantage over the naive. When other teams' front offices analyzed players who present trade-offs that go against the status-quo like the height-related examples of Russell Wilson, Brandon Browner, and Richard Sherman, they tended to see only the limitations of their respective situations and not the potential. When other teams select their players on draft day, they're more likely than us to trade up and get a guy they want right then, right there while we trade down and enjoy the spoils of delaying the gratification of our selection. Where others have seen deficiency and what they immediately want, we've seen the hidden opportunity.
I've read about Alcoa, a company with its share of employee injuries as a result of deficiencies in their overall manufacturing methods. Paul O'Neill became the CEO and made reducing their number of employee injuries their companies highest priority, even more so than profit. What's remarkable about this seemingly counter-intuitive approach is it not only resulted in Alcoa becoming one of the safest companies in the world, but they became considerably more profitable in the process. When I read "Lotus pose on two", an ESPN article covering our team's attempts to kindly engage its players with yoga, meditation, and an overall message of care, the connection was unmistakable. We treat our players not only like people and not only like people who deserve to succeed in the NFL but people who deserve to succeed in all facets of life. Just like Paul O'Neill before him, Pete Carroll had learned their was a better way of doing things and he made it one of our top priorities.
Lastly, I've read about sunk cost fallacy and loss aversion. People might eat more than we may want to of an expensive meal because we feel that in doing so we're getting more of our money's worth despite the long-term costs of overeating being considerably greater. We do this both because of our attachment to investments and our tendency to feel about twice as negative about losing something as we would feel positive if we gained that very same something. Similarly, PC and JS could have held onto Harvin given our considerable investment yielded in his acquisition and yet they elected not to do so even with of one of greater inherent motivations of human nature in loss aversion compelling them not to. Put it all together and there's a very distinct pattern to be seen with our organization.
Above all else, our guys are rational. We actively think about what's true, whether it's relating to the effect of certain measurables like height on players' potential, the best way to coach a player, the best kind of occupational culture to have, etc. We also actively adapt our assertions about what's true into the everyday processes we've used to make our team's culture what it is today. What we've accomplished and are continuing to accomplish isn't just a triumph of sport, it's been a triumph over a multitude of the issues preventing many of us from enjoying life as much as we could.
I've read about coaching and the neurological functions behind the development of expertise. When I watched an exchange between Kris Richard and Earl Thomas after a play during training camp, it served as a reminder that what a coach teaches isn't half as important as how he chooses to attempt to teach it. The play was a short pass over the middle where ET was narrowly beaten as his diving attempt to swat the ball was inches short of denying the completion. Kris Richard ran up to ET like he was defender in the NBA and ET had just received a pass, asked him what happened, and shook his head in disagreement at ET's assertion that he was just too slow to make the play. He then proceeded to demonstrate that had ET attempted to deflect the pass with his right arm instead of his left (he was diving to his left) his body would have been able to extend a slightly greater distance, and he would have made the play. Kris Richard then quickly ran back to the sideline and this exchange was over before all the players were even back to the line of scrimmage. What this accomplished was ET's error was identified and corrected without taking him out of the situational context of where the information is important. It was also done quickly enough to allow ET zero opportunity to misjudge his own error. Social scientists who study learning advocate this very approach and we've been intently personifying what they preach.
I've read about status-quo bias and our tendencies to prefer immediate gratification over delayed gratification. Status-quo bias is the tendency for us to prefer continuing as we are because we mistake change as a presumably negative experience instead of a more accurate prediction that involves the potential for improvement. In studies we've been noted to make odd decisions like preferring a cheaper but less consistent electrical service over a more expensive but more consistent competitor when it's the one we're used to and not necessarily the best service for our needs. We've been noted to prefer receiving a gift of $100 today over $200 a month from now but when the question is changed to a gift of $100 12 months from now or a gift of $200 13 months from now, we no longer mind waiting the extra month for an addition $100 dollars. We are prone to errors we may not even be aware of and those who are aware gain a competitive advantage over the naive. When other teams' front offices analyzed players who present trade-offs that go against the status-quo like the height-related examples of Russell Wilson, Brandon Browner, and Richard Sherman, they tended to see only the limitations of their respective situations and not the potential. When other teams select their players on draft day, they're more likely than us to trade up and get a guy they want right then, right there while we trade down and enjoy the spoils of delaying the gratification of our selection. Where others have seen deficiency and what they immediately want, we've seen the hidden opportunity.
I've read about Alcoa, a company with its share of employee injuries as a result of deficiencies in their overall manufacturing methods. Paul O'Neill became the CEO and made reducing their number of employee injuries their companies highest priority, even more so than profit. What's remarkable about this seemingly counter-intuitive approach is it not only resulted in Alcoa becoming one of the safest companies in the world, but they became considerably more profitable in the process. When I read "Lotus pose on two", an ESPN article covering our team's attempts to kindly engage its players with yoga, meditation, and an overall message of care, the connection was unmistakable. We treat our players not only like people and not only like people who deserve to succeed in the NFL but people who deserve to succeed in all facets of life. Just like Paul O'Neill before him, Pete Carroll had learned their was a better way of doing things and he made it one of our top priorities.
Lastly, I've read about sunk cost fallacy and loss aversion. People might eat more than we may want to of an expensive meal because we feel that in doing so we're getting more of our money's worth despite the long-term costs of overeating being considerably greater. We do this both because of our attachment to investments and our tendency to feel about twice as negative about losing something as we would feel positive if we gained that very same something. Similarly, PC and JS could have held onto Harvin given our considerable investment yielded in his acquisition and yet they elected not to do so even with of one of greater inherent motivations of human nature in loss aversion compelling them not to. Put it all together and there's a very distinct pattern to be seen with our organization.
Above all else, our guys are rational. We actively think about what's true, whether it's relating to the effect of certain measurables like height on players' potential, the best way to coach a player, the best kind of occupational culture to have, etc. We also actively adapt our assertions about what's true into the everyday processes we've used to make our team's culture what it is today. What we've accomplished and are continuing to accomplish isn't just a triumph of sport, it's been a triumph over a multitude of the issues preventing many of us from enjoying life as much as we could.
